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This paper tackles two established puzzles in international macroeconomics literature. The first is
the lack of systematic difference in the macroeconomic performance across exchange rate regimes.
The second is the absence of a clear empirical relationship between macroeconomic performance
and  capital-account  liberalization.  We  suggest  that  both  may  appear  because  empirical
methodologies fail to account for a latent economic "crisis state," influenced by exchange-rate and
capital account regimes, and to allow the effects of a policy regime on growth to depend on whether
the economy is in a crisis-prone latent state. In practice, we model and estimate the latent state of the
economy as a crisis probability. In the framework we propose, exchange rate and capital market
liberalization regimes can have both a direct effect on short-term growth, and an indirect effect on
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1. INTRODUCTION 
International economics theory has long recognized that pegging exchange rates 
should improve macroeconomic performance. The idea is that by fixing their currencies 
to international moneys (the Dollar, the Euro, or the Yen), fiscally-disciplined emerging 
economies could rapidly accumulate exchange reserves through export growth, be able 
to maintain a high saving ratio, and provide certainty to business and profit margins to 
investors. Such a policy environment can lead to a low and stable domestic rate of 
interest, and thus enables the economy to retain the confidence of international investors. 
However, every major international economic crisis of the past 15 years (save Brazil in 
2002) has been rooted in rigid exchange rate regimes. Thus, Stanley Fischer (2001) 
succinctly observed that: “Each of the major international capital market-related crises 
since 1994--Mexico, in 1994, Thailand, Indonesia and Korea in 1997, Russia and Brazil 
in 1998, and Argentina and Turkey in 2000--has in some way involved a fixed or pegged 
exchange rate regime. At the same time, countries that did not have pegged rates--among 
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them South Africa, Israel in 1998, Mexico in 1998, and Turkey in 1998--avoided crises 
of the type that afflicted emerging market countries with pegged rates.” 
Indeed, there has been a long-standing view that an emerging economy under a peg, 
with government budget imbalances, trade deficits, and the presence of free-market 
policies that facilitate the outflow of capital, is likely to become vulnerable to sudden 
stops of capital inflows; hence, lead to a balance of payments crisis. A “sudden stops” 
crisis often entails a financial or currency crisis, accompanied by a sharp fall in output. 
Capital controls could reduce contagion effects, and thereby serve to lower the risk of 
financial crises.
2 A possible channel through which the probability of a crisis affects 
growth is as follows.  If the domestic currency is pegged to a "world currency" it 
provides a less risky environment for investors and the country may be able to attract 
more external funds to complement more domestically funded investment. This could 
then increase growth. However, if foreign investors perceive that there is a sufficiently 
high probability that there will be a sudden stop of inflows that leads to a crisis, they 
may be less willing to invest. This could then decrease growth.
3 Similarly, benefits of 
capital market liberalization come typically from three factors. Revoking capital controls 
could lower the cost of capital and thereby promote investment. Capital-market 
liberalization could turn country-specific risks into diversifiable risks. Furthermore, the 
efficiency of allocation of domestic capital could also be enhanced. However, financial 
liberalization could also increase the risk of sudden stops to capital inflows, which could 
bring about defaults and recession.
 4  
A related policy-regime evaluation issue is financial dollarisation, and its effect on the 
macroeconomic performance. The “original sin” concept, introduced by Barry 
Eichengreen and Ricardo Haussman (1999), explain the consequences for emerging 
markets of abrupt departures from an exchange rate peg regime due to sudden stops in 
capital inflows. The “original sin” concept underpins a crucial vulnerability of the 
economy under peg regimes. The phrase refers to the inability of a country to borrow 
abroad in its own currency, because no foreign creditor is willing to gamble on the 
potential exchange rate instability. A plausible explanation for the widespread use in 
dollarized debt is that countries are forced into this position because their monetary and 
fiscal policies lack credibility. If a country issued debt in domestic currency, it would 
                                                             
2 For an early analytical approach to the problem of sudden stops, see Calvo (1998). Among recent papers on sudden-stops’ 
vulnerability, and its relation to fixed exchange rate regimes, see also Calvo (2000), Calvo, Reinhart and Vegh (1995), Chang 
and Velasco (2000), Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf (2000), Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) and Williamson (2000). Sharp current 
account reversals, which require a quick adjustment of the balance between domestic saving and investment (see Milesi Feretti 
and Razin (1996)), and the associated substantial depreciations, that trigger financial distress, tend to cause and to exacerbate 
recessions.  
3 In the empirical section we include the external debt as an exclusion restriction in the growth equation to identify the 
probability equation. In the data, the external debt is indeed strongly correlated with the crisis probability, but only weakly 
correlated with growth. The possible channel through which the probability of a crisis affects growth indicated in the text is not 
necessarily inconsistent with the empirical correlations to the extent that the funding of domestic investment is mostly from 
domestic saving when the crisis probability is low. 
 
4 For an historical perspective on capital controls see Voth (2004). See also Rodrik (2002) who cites Keynes: “I 
sympathize with those who would minimize, rather than… maximize economic entanglements between 
nations. Ideas, art, knowledge, hospitality and travel should be international. But let goods be homespun 
whenever reasonable and above all let finance be primarily national.” 
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have an incentive to inflate its way out of debt. Investors, who expect that the 
government will succumb to such temptation, refuse to buy domestic currency- 
denominated debt papers.
5 In net terms, the foreign currency liabilities of residents of 
developing and transition countries usually exceed their assets in foreign currencies, 
implying that they are exposed to exchange rate risk on their balance sheets, as well as 
through trade. Issues of both sovereign and corporate bonds on international markets are 
overwhelmingly in foreign currencies, even in the case of an advanced economy such as 
Korea, or a country whose exchange rate is strongly pegged to the U.S. dollar, such as 
Argentina in the 1990s.
 6 
Combining these insights, this paper aims at contributes to the resolution of long 
standing puzzles in the literature. The main idea of the paper is that a sudden stop crisis 
that could have happened but did not, affects growth in a negative way, for example 
inducing a liquidity shortage. If this is the case, the puzzling failure to establish 
empirically a relationship between the exchange rate regime and the growth rate is due to 
the exclusion of the projected crisis probability from the econometric analysis. Arguing 
that such a crisis probability should indeed be included for the purpose of evaluating 
policy-regime implications, we estimate a reduced form empirical model relating short-
term (cyclically unadjusted) output growth rates to policy regimes in a panel of 
developing countries. This makes it possible to estimate the effects of policy regimes on 
macroeconomic outcomes, and their relationship to the “crisis state” of the economy as 
projected by the market participants. 
The organization of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we briefly survey related 
empirical literature and discuss theoretical insights that serve as a background guide to 
the empirical analysis. In section 3, we describe the econometric methodology relevant 
for the evaluation of policy regimes in the presence of financial crises, and we introduce 
the data set. Section 4 presents the main empirical findings concerning the role of the 
crisis probability in the evaluation of policy regimes, and discusses their implications 
and robustness to different specifications, interpretations, and data sources. The 
concluding Section 5 summarized the results and reviews caveats and possible 
extensions. 
2.  RELATED LITERATURE 
Strikingly, the empirical literature has not been able to identify clear-cut real effects of 
exchange-rate regimes on the open economy. Indeed, Marianne Baxter and Alan 
                                                             
5 Indeed, 97 percent of all debt, placed in international markets between 1999 and 2001, was denominated in five currencies: 
the US Dollar, the Euro, the Yen, the Pound Sterling and the Swiss Franc. This feature of emerging markets' borrowing in the 
international market leads to balance-sheet type of currency crises, as formalized by Krugman (2000), and Schneider and 
Tornell (2000). 
6  Part of this exchange rate risk can be hedged, although only (in the aggregate for a given developing country) to the limited 
extent that non-residents are willing to hold local currency exposure. Large cross-holdings of foreign assets and liabilities 
means that the valuation channel of exchange rate adjustment has grown in importance, relative to the traditional trade balance 
channel. In this context, see also Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004), for an empirical analysis of the inter-connections between 
capital account openness and the exchange rate adjustment process. 
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Stockman (1989) and Robert Flood and Andy Rose (1995) find that there are no 
significant differences in business cycles across exchange rate regimes. A recent study 
Frankel and Wei (2004) explores how output lost in crises is related to various controls, 
including the degree of exchange rate flexibility, currency mismatch, FDI, etc. The 
exchange rate flexibility variable is found as not statistically significant.
7 
Similarly, no definitive view emerges as to the aggregate effects of capital account 
liberalization. Indeed, Eichengreen (2001) who overviews the literature, points to 
ambiguities in the rather complex role played by capital account liberalization; and 
Rodrik (1998) finds no significant statistical association between capital account 
openness and growth. A recent study by Prasad et al (2005) finds that it is difficult to 
establish a robust causal relationship between the degree of financial integration and 
growth performance for developing countries. Kristin Forbes (2005) surveys the 
inconclusive macroeconomic evidence on capital controls like this: “…of the 14 recent 
papers they (that is, Prasad et al. (2005)) examine, three find a positive effect of financial 
integration on growth, four find no effect, and seven find mixed results”.
8 Traditional 
explanations for the inconclusiveness focus on inaccurate measurement of capital 
account openness,
 9  and on the possibly different effects of different types of capital 
flows and capital control.
10   
2.1.  Theory as a guide to the empirical analysis 
This paper provides a different explanation to the puzzle. Self-fulfilling expectations 
games played by market participants have elements of a “beauty contest”. Market 
participants must care, not just about acting in the way that conforms with current 
fundamentals, but also about acting similarly to the way other do. Currency regimes 
determine the stochastic distribution of the fundamentals and the effect of the market 
                                                             
7 See however a recent study by Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenneger (2003), who find real effects of exchange-rate regime in cross-
country data. Another exception is Rose (2000). In the paper, Rose uses evidence from existing currency unions in the world 
economy, to estimate the effect of currency unions on international trade. Rose finds that a currency union (which is an 
extreme form of a peg) expands bilateral trade between two average member countries by a huge proportion (200%, and more). 
Rose's currency union effects were reduced substantially when fixed country effects were incorporated in the analysis. Persson 
(2001) challenged Rose’s analysis, but also finds significant, albeit modest, effect of currency unions. Anderson and van 
Wincoop (2003) demonstrated the importance of including country fixed effects in gravity models. Although commonly 
estimated gravity equations generally have a very good fit to the data, they show that they are not theoretically grounded and 
prone to lead to biased estimation. They applied the method to solve the border puzzle. They find specifically that borders 
reduce bilateral national trade levels by plausible though substantial magnitudes. 
8 A more definite view concerning positive effects of capital account liberalization on output, which is advanced by Fischer 
(1998), is supported by some evidence, provided by Quinn (1997). The role of pre-existing policies, and of trade-account vs. 
capital-account sequencing, in determining the effects of capital control liberalization on growth and investment, is examined 
by Arteta, Eichengreen and Wyplosz (2001), Chinn and Ito (2002), and Tornell, Westermann, and Martinez (2004). A recent 
evaluation of this literature by Prasad et al. (2004) yields also inconclusive result. It shows no significant relationship between 
financial openness and growth in real per capita income across countries, even after controlling for a series of standard 
explanatory variables (initial income, initial schooling, investment-GDP ratio, political instability, and regional dummies. See 
also Ariyoshi et al (2000), Bhagwati (1998), Edwards (1999, 2000) and Kaplan and Rodrik (2000). 
9 Most of the studies use rough numerical indices of different policies and regulations. Other studies use de facto measures of 
integration (such as capital flows or foreign asset holdings) which are determined jointly with the macroeconomic performance 
they are supposed to explain. 
10  Recent work (see, for example, Razin (2004)) suggests that the growth effects of foreign direct investment may be greater 
than other capital flows.  CURRENCY REGIMES: CRISES AND GROWTH 
 
6 
fundamentals on the macroeconomic performance. This is because the credibility, and 
effectiveness, of macroeconomic policies must depend on the currency regimes 
themselves. Thus, a currency regime exerts not only a direct effect on growth, through 
its effect on the market fundamentals (as in the traditional macroeconomic literature) but 
it also have an indirect effect on growth, through its impact on the probability of 
financial crises, based on the endogenously determined expectations, and the way these 
expectations are coordinated. 
In a stylised model of international capital flows associated with big fluctuations in the 
real exchange rate, Krugman (2000) identifies a general equilibrium link between real 
depreciations and macroeconomic performance in the presence of sudden stops. The 
driving mechanism in the model is the negative effect of real depreciations on the 
balance sheet of firms; hence on domestic investment spending. In that and other papers’ 
common knowledge setting, all agents have the same knowledge about the 
fundamentals, and there exist multiple self-fulfilling equilibria. In recent literature, 
however, capital account reversals are triggered not only by fundamental shocks, but 
also by the degree to which market expectations about these fundamentals are 
coordinated (Morris and Shin, 2000). In the absence of common knowledge, an 
individual market participant receives only an independent and noisy signal about the 
fundamentals but also must have some uncertainty about the other market participants’ 
expectations. Morris and Shin (2000) show how the market participants' knowledge 
about the statistical distributions of signals and market fundamentals (but not the actual 
realization of the fundamental and its idiosyncratic signals) helps to coordinate the 
behaviour of market participants.  
The coordination of expectations induces a unique equilibrium in such a set up, in 
which there exists a threshold level of the fundamental. That is, withdrawals from the 
domestic capital market materialize if the realized level of the fundamental is below the 
threshold; injections of capital into the market occur if the realized level of the 
fundamental is   above the threshold. As a consequence, the equilibrium macroeconomic 
performance can be specified as a one-to-one function of a fundamental ex-ante 
probability of the financial crisis, derived from the probability distribution of the 
fundamentals is correlated with the macroeconomic performance.
11 This gives a 
theoretical underpinning for the econometric model of the next section. 
3. EMPIRICAL APPROACH 
The empirical test for the effects of exchange rate regimes on the economy is rooted in 
the theory of sudden stops that we describe in the previous section. Theory suggests that 
coordination of expectations by market participants may trigger a financial crisis in a 
situation characterized by a latent threshold state of the economy, determined by key 
macro fundamentals. The equilibrium is unique: a financial crisis occurs if the latent 
                                                             
11 Because the information is noisy, neither the market participants, who observe idiosyncratic signals, nor the econometrician, 
who observes only the equilibrium outcomes, could obtain  precise information about the threshold level which triggers a 
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variable is below a certain threshold, and the economy's growth performance is weak. 
Above the threshold, financial crises are avoided and economic growth is strong. The 
estimated probability of sudden stops, which proxies the latent threshold state variable, is 
assumed to be negatively correlated with growth. 
 From the perspective of the theory of policy regimes, there are good reasons to expect 
that the crisis threshold is also directly affected by the policy regime itself. For example, 
a peg is expected to lower the crisis threshold, and thus increase the crisis probability, 
for any given combination of country specific and world economy shocks. Likewise, 
capital market liberalization tends to raise the crisis probability. In other words, the 
adoption of a peg is expected to have a direct positive effect on growth, through the trade 
adjustment channel, and an indirect negative effect, through a crisis-probability channel. 
Similarly, the adoption of capital account liberalization is expected to have a direct 
positive effect on growth, through capital market efficiency channels, and an indirect 
negative effect, through a crisis-probability channel.  
The effect of the policy regime on growth is assumed to depend on the whether the 
economy is in a latent crisis state. The probability of the crisis state is obtained by fitting 
a Probit Model (or, alternatively, a Logit, or a Linear Probability Model) to the sample 
frequencies of observed crises, depending on the policy regime dummies and controls. 
Accordingly, a short term growth equation is fitted to the sample, depending on policy 
regimes, the estimated crisis probability, and standard controls. Policy-regime variables 
are modelled in level and change forms, capturing pre-existing policy-regimes and 
current changes in the regimes (whether a country switches from float to peg, or whether 
a country is imposing capital controls). The crisis probability itself depends on policy 
regime indicators, as well as on variable such as lagged sudden stops crises, government 
budget deficit, and initial GDP per capita. 
In practice, we estimate a reduced form empirical model relating short-term (cyclically 
unadjusted) output growth rates in a panel of developing countries, to policy regimes. 
The dependent variable, as an indicator of macroeconomic performance, is the short term 
(cyclically unadjusted) GDP growth rate. We choose as a measure of “sudden stop” 
crisis realizations a large annual depreciation in the real exchange rate. We model its 
probability by fitting a probability model (Probit, Logit, or linear), noting that such 
empirical models may be derived from a latent-variable specification (see e.g. 
Wooldridge, 2003) that is consistent with the theoretical framework outlined above.  
The measure of large real depreciations captures the effects of international financial 
crises on the domestic financial side as well as the real side of the economy.
12 Typically, 
                                                             
12 Typically in the currency crisis literature sudden stops are measured by free falls in the nominal exchange rate. However, 
this does not distinguish between domestic price crises and balance-of-payments crises. In our indicator, crisis episodes do not 
include, therefore, countries which suffer from bouts of high inflation and currency depreciation, but with stable real exchange 
rates, because they do not qualify to be classified as balanced-of-payments crises. Evidently, the real exchange rate measure for 
crisis is strongly correlated with sharp reversals in the current-account balance; see Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (2000). Calvo, 
Izquierdo and Majia (2004) find that real exchange rate fluctuations coming hand in hand with sudden stops are a unique 
phenomenon in emerging-market economies. They use a sample of 32 developing countries, to analyze the empirical 
characteristics of sudden stops in capital flows and their relations to balance sheet effects. See also Bacchetta, Aghion and 
Banerjee (2001), Krugman (2000), Allen, Rosenberg, Keller, Sester, and Roubini (2002), and Eichengreen and Hausmann 
(1999). See also Bacchetta, Aghion and Banerjee (2001), Krugman (2000), Allen, Rosenberg, Keller, Sester, and Roubini 
(2002), and Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999s.  CURRENCY REGIMES: CRISES AND GROWTH 
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unexpected depreciations of the real exchange rate (rather than the nominal exchange 
rate) are likely to have significant balance-sheet effects, leading to bankruptcies and 
unemployment.  
The correlation between growth and currency regimes may of course reflect other 
underlying factors at play, not necessarily the true effect of the regime. For example, the 
cross-section correlation may be the outcome of time-invariant, unobserved, 
heterogeneity (across countries) rather than a causal effect of the regime on growth. 
Similarly, the time-series co-movements (within countries) may be the outcome of the 
effect of growth on the currency regime, rather than a causal effect of the regime on 
growth. To address the endogeneity issue we condition the time-invariant unobserved 
variation in the sample on country fixed-effects. We also instrument the variation over 
time in the sample (within a country) by using a measure of the past spell of the peg 
regime, which summarizes the history of the regime. The measure of the peg spell is 
defined as the number of years that a country had a pegged exchange rate up to that point 
of time, lagged by 6 years. Our identifying assumption is that the history of peg spell is 
not correlated with the error term (controlling for country fixed-effects). In addition, we 
also use lagged crisis (as a proxy for the crisis-related characteristics that are not 
captured by the country fixed effects or the peg spell measure), and lagged currency 
regime switches (as proxies for the current level or changes of the currency regime).   
Self-selection may of course be a problem. For example, when the crisis probability is 
high, a successful switch to peg can only be implemented by countries for which 
governments have some strong belief about the health of domestic economic 
fundamentals (like the case of Hong Kong during the Asian crises). Thus, the conclusion 
that the adoption of the peg is good for growth in a state of high probability of crisis may 
not be valid. Because the policy switch may be based on a self-selection of countries, 
from a pool of countries. In other words, it may be that a country chooses to adopt a 
specific exchange rate regime because of its underlying economic fundamentals. It may 
be the case that the probability of a crisis is driven by these fundamentals rather than by 
the exchange rate regime itself. In such a case one cannot necessarily conclude that the 
exchange rate regime is responsible for the outcome. To address this issue we run an 
auxiliary regression of the peg on several instruments, and use the instrumented peg not 
the actual peg, in the growth equation. The instruments that we have available are: (1) 
the past spell of the exchange-rate peg regime, (2) time dummies, and (3) country fixed 
effects. These instruments are likely to capture important characteristics of the health of 
a country's domestic economic fundamentals, and various time dependent shocks to the 
world economy. The latter are presumably strongly correlated with the choice of the 
exchange rate regime and the country's growth rate. CURRENCY REGIMES: CRISES AND GROWTH 
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In sum, our empirical methodology is capable of capturing the effects of policy 
regimes on macroeconomic outcomes, depending on a “Crisis State” of the economy, as 
projected by market participants.
13  
3.1.  The data  
We have assembled data consisting of 105 middle and low income countries in the 
period 1970 to 1997. 
14 Because of lags in the estimation (up to six period lags), and non 
availability of some variables for some countries, we reduce the sample to 92 countries 
(see Table 1), with 985 annual observations. 
We measure sudden stop crises by large fluctuations in the real exchange rate. In doing 
so, we attempt to capture the effects of the financial crisis on the real side of the 
economy through the balance sheet channel.
15 
16 Specifically, a sudden-stop crisis is 
defined by a sharp depreciation of the real exchange rate, with a 15 percent-per-year 
minimum threshold (a lower boundary of a one standard deviation band in our sample).  
We implement a binary index based on multiple categories of the IMF- classification 
of exchange rate regimes. We also implement a binary index based on the different 
multiple categories of the Reinhart and Rogoff classification of exchange rate regimes, 
but only for a sub-sample of 58 countries of the 100 countries.
17 As a proxy for the 
exchange rate regime in the recent past we define the instrumental variable peg spell in 
period t for country j, as the number of the years from t-2 to t-6, in which the country has 
been on a peg.   
Measuring the degree of openness of trade and capital accounts is always a heroic task. 
Since 1950, the IMF has issued an annual publication, which tries to describe the 
controls that its member countries have in place on various current account capital 
account transactions. We measure capital-account openness by a binary index based on a 
                                                             
13 Nesting a probit estimate in a panel may raise in general issues in the statistical distribution of the error term. Often, a noisy 
explanatory variable may bias the standard errors in the second-stage growth regression. A bias in the standard errors exists 
when the latent variable, although being known to the economic agent, is, however unknown to the econometrician. This issue 
is mute in our case because the projected probability of the “Crisis-prone State” is the same for market participants and the 
econometrician. Hence, in our case the second-stage standard errors are not biased. 
14 We updated data set, originally assembled by Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti and Assaf Razin (2000), to account for the Asian 
crisis in 1997. 
15 Typically in the currency crisis literature sudden stops are measured by free falls in the nominal exchange rate. However, 
this does not distinguish between domestic price crises and balance-of-payments crises. In our indicator, crisis episodes do not 
include, therefore, countries which suffer from bouts of high inflation and currency depreciation, but with  stable real exchange 
rates, because they do not qualify to be classified as balanced-of-payments crises. Evidently, the real exchange rate measure for 
crisis is strongly correlated with sharp reversals in the current-account balance. See Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (2000). See also 
Calvo, Izquierdo and Majia (2004) on sudden stops and real-exchange-rate fluctuations.  
16 Calvo, Izquierdo, and Mejia (2004) find that real exchange rate fluctuations coming hand in hand with sudden stops are a 
unique phenomenon in emerging-market economies. They use a sample of 32 developing countries, to analyze the empirical 
characteristics of sudden stops in capital flows and their relations to balance sheet effects. See also Bacchetta, Aghion and 
Banerjee (2001), Krugman (2000), Allen, Rosenberg, Keller, Sester, and Roubini (2002), and Eichengreen and Hausmann 
(1999). See also Bacchetta, Aghion and Banerjee (2001), Krugman (2000), Allen, Rosenberg, Keller, Sester, and Roubini 
(2002), and Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999). 
17 Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) updated the IMF official classification of exchange rate regimes prior to 1997, as described in 
the various issues of the IMF's Annual Report on Exchange Rate Arrangements and Exchange Rate Restrictions. The IMF 
empirical definition of exchange rate regimes is based on formal government statements. The Reinhart-Rogoff classification is 
based on an empirical algorithm, factoring in ex-post behavior. The Reinhart-Rogoff classification applies to only a subset of 
the original sample of 100 countries.  CURRENCY REGIMES: CRISES AND GROWTH 
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list of   various restrictions on capital account transactions, reported in the IMF Annual 
Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions.
18  
Table 2 presents some stylized facts for growth, the frequency of crises, the frequency 
of the peg regime, the average spell of the peg regime, and the frequency of capital 
controls; all classified by years and by regions. We can see that growth is variable across 
time and region, crises are rare, the frequency of a peg is large, and the frequency of 
capital controls is very large. In Table 3 we present simple correlations between the 
growth, peg, peg spell, capital controls and crises. There is almost no correlation 
between the peg regime and growth, indicating that the first “puzzle” is present in the 
data. Capital controls are correlated negatively with growth, positively with exchange 
rate pegs, and negatively with the crisis indicator. The peg state and peg spell are highly 
correlated (but the peg spell and growth are only weakly correlated), indicating that the 
peg spell could indeed serve as a good instrument. In Table 4 we present similar 
correlations while controlling for country fixed effects. Among the highlights we find 
that the peg and the growth rate are only weakly correlated while capital controls and 
growth are negatively correlated. We find that the crisis and peg are no longer strongly 
correlated, and capital controls and peg spell are not significantly correlated either. The 
fact that peg and peg spell are significantly correlated, whereas peg and growth are not 
correlated, implies that the peg spell is a good instrument for the policy regime dummies. 
4.  ESTIMATION RESULTS  
Table 5 presents the estimation of the base line econometric model. (A few outliers of 
exceptional negative growth are excluded.)  The table consists of three panels. Panel A 
presents growth equations, with and without the probability of crisis as the explanatory 
variable. If the crisis probability is excluded, the coefficient of the instrumented peg is 
positive (2.8765) but not significant. The coefficient of capital controls is negative (-
1.1670) and significant, while the coefficient of the switch to the peg is negative (-
1.0252) but not significant. If the crisis probability is included, the coefficient of the 
instrumented peg is positive (5.2629) and significant. The coefficient of capital controls 
is negative (-1.5811) and significant, and the coefficient of the switch to the peg is 
negative (-2.8357) and significant. The direct effect of the policy regimes are uncovered 
if we control for the crisis probability in the growth equation. The crisis probability’s 
coefficient is negative (-6.0377) and significant. 
Panel B presents the crisis probability equation. Instrumented peg has a significant 
positive coefficient (2.6578), capital controls has a significant negative coefficient (-
0.4594), and the switch to capital controls has a significant negative coefficient (-
1.2737). The exclusion restriction variable, the external debt, has a significant positive 
coefficient (0.0125). Panel C presents the auxiliary peg equation. Lagged switch to peg, 
and peg spell, have positive and significant coefficients. This is a positive evidence for 
the role they play as instruments.   
                                                             
18The policy regime dummies can be interpreted as rule based. For alternative quantitative measures, see Edison et al (2004). CURRENCY REGIMES: CRISES AND GROWTH 
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We can decompose the effect of policy regimes on growth into direct and indirect 
effects for the sample average as follows. The instrumented peg has a coefficient of 0.6 
in the probit regression panel, whereas an increase in the crisis probability reduces 
growth by 6 percentage points (a lot!) per year, in the growth regression panel. 
Therefore, the indirect effect of the instrumented peg on growth is -3.6 percentage 
points, per year. The direct effect of the peg on growth is 5.2 percentage points, per year. 
The overall (marginal) effect is mildly positive, 1.6 percentage points, per year. But this 
is the magnitude of the effect for the sample average. Because the crisis probability 
equation is non linear, the composition and size of the effect would change with 
variations in the magnitude of the crisis probability. 
4.1.    Exploring nonlinear effects  
One may wonder whether the non linear indirect effect, via the probability channel, 
shown in Table 5, masks another non linear direct effect of the regime on growth.  
In Table 6 we specify, as an alternative hypothesis, a polynomial structure for the 
currency regime. The Table has three panels: polynomials of order one, two and three, 
for the currency regime variable, respectively. Columns (iii) may seem to imply that the 
effect of the peg is non-linear because the coefficient of the linear term is positive and 
the coefficient of the quadratic term is negative. Yet, once we introduce the crisis 
probability as an independent variable in column (iv) the direct non-linear effect 
disappears because the coefficient of the quadratic term is insignificant. The polynomial 
of order 2 in panel C of Table 6 has insignificant coefficients, because of severe 
multicollinearity among variables of the polynomial. 
To investigate the phenomenon of non linearity further, we compare in Table 7 Probit, 
Logit and linear probability models. The coefficient of the instrumented peg is larger in 
the growth equation for all three probability models than in the growth equation where 
the crisis probability is excluded (see Panel A). Similarly, capital controls exert a 
stronger negative direct effect on growth if the crisis probability is included in the 
growth equation. The crisis probability has a significant negative coefficient in all three 
probability specifications. The effect is stronger in the Probit and Logit compared to the 
linear probability model. 
In Panel B the qualitative effects of policy regimes on the crisis probability are similar 
across the three probability specifications.   
We conclude that the main results are robust for the specification of the probability 
model. The Probit and Logit fit the data better than the linear probability. 
4.2.   The effects of currency regimes   
The reduced-form marginal effect of a policy-regime switch from float to peg, which 
incorporates both a direct and an indirect effect (which is working through the crisis 
probability), is plotted in Figure 1 against the projected probability (estimated in the CURRENCY REGIMES: CRISES AND GROWTH 
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Probit model). The U-shaped graph implies that in the extreme ranges, when the 
probability is relatively low and when the probability is relatively high, the marginal 
effect of the policy switch is positive. This is because in these ranges of the projected 
probability function the regime switch does not trigger a big change in the probability, 
and the direct effect on growth of the regime switch dominates the indirect effect.  In the 
intermediate range for the probability function, the reduced-form marginal effect of a 
policy-regime switch from float to peg is negative. This because the policy-regime 
switch does generate a big marginal increase in the probability of crisis and the indirect 
effect of the regime switch dominates the direct effect. The linear probability model does 
not, however, produce a flat line. Indeed, a switch to peg does not have positive effects 
at ranges where the estimated probability of crisis is close to upper bound one.  
Figure 1 also plots the frequency of crisis probability in the sample. Almost all the 
observations are concentrated in the low probability range. There almost no observations 
for crisis probabilities above 50 percent. Therefore the high probability estimate of the 
effect of the peg is not policy relevant. As the probability gets closer to the sample 
average the growth effect of the peg is small, consistently with the first “puzzle” of the 
traditional literature. Similarly, Figure 2 demonstrates how the reduced-form marginal 
effect of capital controls, which incorporates both the direct and the indirect effects, 
depends on the crisis probability. The reversed U-shaped diagram implies that the 
marginal effect of the policy switch is mostly negative. However, in the intermediate 
probability range, the marginal effect of the policy-regime is less negative. As one gets 
closer to the sample average, the second “puzzle” of the traditional literature is observed.   
4.3.  Different exchange- rate regime classifications 
In this section we use the Reinhart-Rogoff classification for the exchange rate regime, 
as a robustness check to see if our results are sensitive to an alternative classification. 
The alternative classification applies to only a subset of the original sample of 100 
countries.
19 Accordingly, we perform in this section a variety of robustness tests: 
sample-robustness and regression-specification. In addition to this we also address the 
difference between domestic price crises and sudden stops crises. 
20   
                                                             
19  The frequency of currency and price crises in the sample are as follows. Sudden stop episodes appear in 
65.5 percent of observations, and domestic-price-crisis episodes occur in 46.1 percent of the observations.  
 
20  We note that the literature has been dealing in the past extensively with the relation between inflation 
and growth. Bruno and Easterly (1998) propose a method, based on discrete high inflation crises, to look at the 
relationships between inflation and growth. They find that growth falls sharply during discrete high inflation 
crises; then growth recovers quickly after inflation falls below the threshold. Their approach, however, implies 
that growth is negatively affected by high inflation, above a certain threshold; but growth is not affected by 
inflation below the threshold.  This discontinuity appears to be somewhat arbitrary. The Bruno-Easterly 
methodology is based on actual domestic price crises. Our methodology points out the role of a latent and 
continuous “crisis-prone state”, estimated by a continuous crisis probability function. This means that even if 
the crisis does not materialize, the crisis probability could still be sufficiently big to affect the rate of growth. 
In this section we consider the effect of domestic price crises in addition to sudden stops’ crises. 
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Table 8 describes the effect of the peg and capital controls on growth. Qualitatively, 
the findings in Table 8 (using the Reinhart-Rogoff classification in the sub sample) and 
Table 5 (using the IMF classification in the broad sample of 100 countries) are very 
similar: a switch to peg has positive coefficient, a switch to capital controls has a 
negative coefficient, and the crisis probability has a negative coefficient; all estimators 
are statistically significant. This can serve as evidence for the robustness of our 
methodological approach. In column (ii) of Table 8, the sudden stop probability includes 
the effect of the domestic price crisis. Notice that the effect of the crisis probability on 
growth is barely significant. In column (iii) we include two types of a projected 
probability of sudden stops: one which includes, and the other which excludes the effect 
of the price crisis. Observe that the coefficient of the latter type of projected probability 
is highly significant and negative. The estimated coefficient is larger in absolute value 
than the corresponding coefficient in column (i) of Table 8. The coefficient of projected 
probability of sudden stops which includes the effect of price crisis, in column (iii), is 
however not significant. We interpret this as evidence that domestic price crisis affect 
growth through the sudden-stops probability channel.                   
4.4.   Currency regimes and debt dollarisation  
We observe that different economies in our sample have also different levels of 
exposure to capital flow volatility that can trigger unanticipated fluctuations in the real 
exchange rate.
 21 We use the ratio of the country’s foreign currency liabilities to its 
money supply (FLM), as a proxy for the country’s foreign currency exposure to 
fluctuations in the real exchange rate. We address the effect of a policy-regime switch on 
dollarisation, and the role of dollarisation in the macroeconomic process.
22 
Table 9 provides estimates of the influence of a policy-regime switch on dollarisation. 
Column (i) indicates that the policy regimes (a switch to peg, and the imposition of 
capital controls) do not have a direct effect on dollarisation. Column (ii) indicates a 
significant effect of the crisis probability, as a single explanatory variable, on 
dollarisation. Column (iii) indicates that policy regimes do not directly affect 
dollarisation, but only indirectly affect dollarisation through the crisis probability.  
So, overall, the table shows that the exchange rate regime can affect the crisis 
probability, which in turn can affect dollarisation. In Table 6 we showed that a switch to 
a peg raises the probability of a crisis, therefore the switch to a peg lowers dollarisation 
through its effect on the crisis probability. The opposite happens when a country 
switches to capital controls.   
                                                             
 
22 Savastano (2004) find that dollarisation appear to increase exchange rate pass-through. This mechanism may reinforce the 
claim that the “fear of floating” is a greater problem for developing economies, with highly dollarized debt. The role of balance 
sheet effects, the linkage between currency risk and country risk, and the impact of dollarisation on trade are analyzed in Levy 
Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003). See also Calvo and Reinhart (2000). 
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We now turn to the analysis of how dollarisation influences growth. Columns  (i) and 
(ii) of Table 10 indicate that FLM, the dollarisation measure, does not have any direct 
influence on growth, once we control for the actual realization of sudden stop crises. A 
crisis, as expected, reduces growth, and in a significant way.  In column (iii) of Table 10 
we introduce the interaction between dollarisation and the realized sudden stops. The 
coefficient of the interaction term is negative and highly significant. This means that 
although dollarisation does not have an independent influence on growth, the interaction 
between dollarisation and the actual crisis, tend to reduce the growth rate drastically.  
This means that the following policy-regime induced mechanism may have been at 
work in the data: The imposition of capital controls tends to lower the probability of 
sudden stops and the decrease in the probability of sudden stops, in turn, tend to raise the 
level of dollarisation. If a crisis actually occurs, then the growth rate diminished. If, 
however the crisis does not materialize, then growth is to a large extent unaffected.       
5. CONCLUSIONS, CAVEATS AND EXTENSIONS 
The choice of macroeconomic policies has been cast traditionally in terms of the well-
known policy tri-lemma. This is a way of describing succinctly a choice among three 
policy goals: pegging the exchange rate, keeping the capital markets open, or conducting 
a business-cycle stabilizing monetary policy. The tri-lemma arises because only two of 
these policy goals can be achieved at any point in time. Both foreign and domestic 
economic shocks (including policy mistakes) may move the equilibrium nominal 
exchange rate away from the pegged rate. If the official rate is overvalued, the defence 
typically requires higher interest rates and fiscal contraction to reduce the current 
account deficit. If the excess demand has become large, either because policy was slow 
to react or because the country has been hit by a strong and long-lasting shock, the 
required policy actions may not be viable; either for political-economic reasons or 
because of the damage they will inflict on the banking system or on aggregate demand. 
Under those circumstances an attack on the exchange rate is likely to succeed.   
Therefore, there is a fourth policy goal: keeping the economy out of sudden stops to 
international capital flows, or other violent types of financial crises.  The literature, 
however, often ignores this aspect of the currency-regime choice problem.
 23 
 
A recurrent problem with the fixed exchange rate regime is that it provides a one-way 
bet to speculators. Often the consequence is massive capital outflows which put upward 
pressures on interest rates. In Latin America and south-east Asia in the 1990s, 
abandoning a fixed exchange rate regime led to severe recessions. On the other hand, the 
benefits of freely floating exchange rate are not unlimited. Exchange rate risks impose 
huge costs on firms. It is costly for firms to divest themselves of this risk, especially in 
low income countries where the financial markets are under-developed. As a 
                                                             
23 The tri-lemma, of a fixed exchange rate, capital mobility, and a monetary policy dedicated to domestic goals, is traditionally 
regarded as the main explanation of the non-viability of pegs.  CURRENCY REGIMES: CRISES AND GROWTH 
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consequence, currency regimes have conflicting effects on growth in a sample of 
emerging markets and low income countries. Therefore, it has been difficult to establish 
clear cut effects of currency regimes for these economies.
  
Indeed, a long standing puzzle in the literature is the failure to find any systematic 
difference in the macroeconomic process across exchange rate regimes. Another puzzle 
is the absence of a robust empirical relation between macroeconomic performance and 
capital-account liberalization. The main idea of the paper is that sudden stop crises 
which could have happened but did not, have affected cyclically unadjusted growth 
negatively.
 24 We bring out theory to rationalize the inclusion of the crisis probability in 
the growth equation in order to evaluate currency regimes. The external debt serves as 
the exclusion restriction variable to identify the probability equation. We use several 
instruments to deal with the endogeneity of currency regimes, including the past spell of 
the pegged regime. 
 We find that the influence on the overall macroeconomic performance of currency 
regimes depends on the likelihood of sudden stops to capital flows. In various 
specifications, if the probability of sudden stops is excluded from the growth equation, 
we find that the instrumented peg and the financial liberalization regime indicators are 
insignificant in the growth equation; thereby tracing the literature “puzzles” in our 
sample. In various specifications, the instrumented peg has a positive and highly 
significant effect on growth after the inclusion of the crisis probability in the growth 
equations, and with the instrumented peg. The instruments that we use are: the past spell 
of the peg, country fixed effects, lagged crises, lagged policy regime switches, and time 
dummies. The external debt serves as the exclusion restriction variable. 
In addition, capital controls (both in levels and changes) have a negative, and highly 
significant, effect on growth after the inclusion of the crisis probability in the growth 
equations  The projected probability of an international financial crisis increases with the 
imposition of an exchange rate peg, and falls with the imposition of capital controls  
(both in level and change forms); The spell of the peg, country fixed effects, lagged 
crises, time dummies, as instruments, and the external debt serves as the exclusion 
restriction variable.  
We also find that the projected crisis probability has significant effects on debt 
dollarisation, and, at the same time, currency regimes determine the degree of debt 
dollarisation through the crisis probability channel. It is the interaction term between the 
degree of dollarisation and realized crises which is significantly negative in the growth 
equation, whereas the coefficients of the currency regime dummies are not significant. 
 
The estimations imply that the overall effect of currency regimes on macroeconomic 
performance work through the direct channel and the crisis probability channel. The 
latter is intrinsically non-linear at an intermediate range of the crisis probability. Thus 
countries with low crisis probability can benefit from an exchange-rate peg and capital 
market liberalization. Countries with an intermediate level of the crisis probability can 
                                                             
24 Directly related is the "Peso problem" literature (e.g., Veronesi (2004)).  CURRENCY REGIMES: CRISES AND GROWTH 
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benefit from a more flexible exchange rate regime and some controls on capital flows. 
We do not have in our sample more than a few countries with an estimated crisis 
probability above 50 percent, however. Therefore we cannot draw any policy-relevant 
conclusion for the effect of policy regime on growth in the high crisis-probability range.  
 
We list a few caveats. The data have little time variation concerning the country-
specific fiscal and monetary shocks. Therefore we are unable to conduct a full-fledged 
dynamic analysis. Accordingly, the econometric methodology we employ is not able to 
analyze persistency of the effects of policy regime on long term growth. The background 
theory that we present in the paper posits that optimising agents will design their 
portfolio strategies based on expectations about policy rules. We have no good theory 
however of policy reaction functions in a financially unstable environment. To take 
seriously the issue of the endogeneity of the policy regimes one has to develop such 
theory and have access to high-frequency data, defined consistently across countries. 
We also note that the indicators of capital controls used in the analysis do not 
distinguish controls on inflows and outflows. Controls on inflows may have quite 
different effects than controls on outflows. Therefore, they exert different influence on 
the probability of sudden stops. Cooper (1999, p. 111) notes that these descriptions are 
very imperfect measures of the extent of restrictions, particularly in the case of the 
capital account: 
“… Restrictions on international capital transactions … come in infinite variety. 
Therefore an accurate portrayal requires knowledge not only of the laws and regulations 
in place, but also of how they are implemented—which often requires much official 
discretion—and of how easily they are circumvented, either legally or illegally. The IMF 
reports the presence of restrictions, but not their intensity or their impact.” 
The IMF empirical definition of exchange rate regimes is based on formal government 
statements. The Reinhart-Rogoff classification is based on an empirical algorithm, 
clustering ex-post behaviour. Both are not pure rule-based proxies, as our framework 
assumes.  
Finally, we suggest two extensions. One extension of our analysis could consider 
regional spill-over effects. The crisis probability may affect one large country in the 
region, may have also negative effects on the growth of other countries in the region.   
Another extension concerns the choice between rules vs. discretion in monetary policy. 
Different monetary rules may systematically affect the probability of bank runs (as in 
Diamond and Dybvig (1983)), or stock market crashes. An econometric valuation of 
monetary rules can incorporate the effect of these rules on the probability of financial 
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APPENDIX A.  A stylised model of sudden stops 
The model posits an exogenous stochastic process for the fundamentals (e.g., 
aggregate export volumes) that foreign creditors estimate based on public and private 
information.  The extended model features a double guessing game by the foreign 
creditors, who receive noisy signals.  First, each foreign creditor assesses the realized 
state of the domestic economy fundamentals; and, second, he/she guesses the likelihood 
of the credit extension-withdrawal action that all the other foreign creditors are going to 
take, given the signals they receive. The rational-expectations’ equilibrium of such 
global game is the set of self fulfilling guesses so that the level of domestic investment 
implicit in the credit offers must match the actual level of investment that takes place 
given those offers.  
Assume that there are N domestic entrepreneurs, who are single mindfully engaged in 
wealth accumulation (save only), and N foreign creditors, who supply the credit which 
domestic entrepreneurs demand in order to make investment. Let It
α denote investment in 
capacity by an individual entrepreneur, and let borrowing be specified as λ times the 
entrepreneur’s net worth, W. Denote by yt, Ft-1 and pt, the domestic output (produced by 
a standard Cobb-Douglas technology with a capital input output share α), the initial debt, 
indexed to foreign goods, and the real exchange rate (the relative price of foreign goods 
in terms of domestic goods), respectively. The entrepreneur’s net worth is: 
 
Wt= α yt- pt Ft-1 .                                                                                                       (A1) 
 
A foreign lender imposes a credit limit, so that the investment, It
α, is constrained by the 
entrepreneur’s net worth, Wt, and the leverage fraction, λ: 
 
It
α≤ (1+λ)Wt                                                                                                                                                                          (A2) 
 










υ υ α − − − − −
=                                                            (A3) 
 
where, I=NI
α, Y=Ny, denote the aggregate domestic investment and aggregate output, 
respectively. The coefficient υ denotes the marginal propensity to import,  t X
~
 denotes 
the stochastic volume of exports, expressed in terms of foreign goods. The cumulative 
distribution function of  t X
~
is given by G( t X
~
). 
An increase the aggregate investment  t I  triggers real appreciation, a fall in t p , 
through a standard “transfer problem” mechanism [see Krugman (2000)]. EVALUATION OF EXCHANGE-RATE 
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Rates of return differentials, which induce foreign creditors to extend loans to 
domestic entrepreneurs, are captured by a weak form of the interest parity condition: 
 









t + ≥ +
+
                                                                                           (A4) 
 
where, r and r
* denote the marginal productivity of capital and the foreign interest rate, 
respectively. We start with the case of common knowledge, as in Krugman (2000). 
Figure A describes the multiplicity of equilibrium outcomes, depending on the 
realization of exports, t X
~
. Because the entrepreneur is insolvent if exports are low and 
the real exchange rate is depreciated, the credit constraint is binding strongly. In this case 
there exists a unique equilibrium with zero investment. In an intermediate case there are 
multiple equilibrium-investment outcomes, due to the existence of expectations-
coordination failure. Because the credit constraint is not binding if the real exchange rate 
is appreciated, there exists a unique equilibrium with investment determined by marginal 
productivity conditions, if export volumes are high. 
Now turn to the case of noisy signals about exports. Assume that a foreign creditor i 






ti t i X ε θ + =                                                                                                           (A5) 
 
The error term εti is assumed to be i.i.d.  
An individual foreign creditor’s decision whether or not to extend credit to the 
domestic entrepreneur crucially depends on her signal, a draw from a uniform 
distribution with a support [-ε, ε]. 
Applying the global-game methodology, there exists a cut-off signal, 
* * * ~
ti t i X ε θ + = , 
so that 
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The marginal individual creditor, who receives a threshold signal 
 
* * * ~
ti t i X ε θ + = ,                                                                                                         (A7) 
 
The creditor is indifferent between withholding, and extending the credit to the 
domestic entrepreneur counterpart. 
Observe that the reduced-form function of equilibrium pt is decreasing in N
~
, the 
number of foreign creditors, and decreasing in export volumes (the fundamental which 
drives the equilibrium outcome) t X
~





t X , therefore determines a unique equilibrium outcome as a 
solution to the global game. Below the threshold 
* ~
t X investment is equal to zero, 
because all foreign investors tend to withhold credit. Above the threshold,
* ~
t X , domestic 
investment is driven by a standard rate-of-return consideration reaching a unique level 
of  t I ; because all foreign investors extend credit and strict interest parity prevails. This 
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Because of the uniqueness of equilibrium it can be summarized by a projected crisis 
probability, which is directly linked to the level of aggregate domestic investment and 
the real exchange rate. An essential feature of the equilibrium is the existence of a 
threshold in the value of some synthetic index of fundamentals (e.g., aggregate export 
volumes) that separate “crisis states” from “no crisis states”. Building on such 
framework we can explain episodes of capital flow reversals. That is, how a state, in 
which foreign creditors decide not to keep lending to the country (be long on foreign 
currency), depends on an estimate that the fundamental is below an endogenous 
equilibrium threshold. The position of the threshold depends: (a) on the distribution of 
the fundamentals; (b) on the stochastic features of the process through which information 
reaches foreign creditors; as well as (c) on the policy regime. We also introduce the 
plausible assumption that the adoption of a peg has a direct positive effect on growth 
through traditional channels, and an indirect effect. The latter negative effect goes 
through a crisis-probability channel. 








Growth, Crises, Pegged Exchange Rate and Capital Controls: Sample Averages
All Decades Region
Variable 1970s 1980s 1990s Africa Latin Asia Europe
Growth 3.32 5.16 2.93 3.00 3.06 2.71 4.92 3.11
Crisis Years (fractions) 0.12 0.07 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.16 0.12 0.06
Peg Years (fractions) 0.63 0.79 0.66 0.51 0.73 0.57 0.55 0.48
Average years 3.61 4.33 3.74 3.06 4.03 3.34 3.20 2.91
under peg  (t-6 to t-2)
Capital Controls' Years 0.88 0.82 0.90 0.88 0.97 0.75 0.84 1.00
(fractions)Table 3:
Correlations Between Growth, Peg, Peg Spell, Capital Controls and Crisis (without Country Fixed-Effects)
Growth Peg Peg Spell
Capital 
Controls    Crisis
Growth 1
Peg -0.0029 1
Peg Spell -0.0265 0.7431* 1
Capital Controls -0.0748* 0.1212* 0.0934* 1
Crisis -0.0404 -0.0599* -0.0537* -0.008 1
Africa
Growth Peg Peg Spell
Capital 
Controls    Crisis
Growth 1
Peg 0.0244 1
Peg Spell 0.008 0.7703* 1
Capital Controls -0.0561 -0.0093 -0.0015 1
Crisis -0.0353 -0.0249 -0.0034 0.0262 1
Latin
Growth Peg Peg Spell
Capital 
Controls    Crisis
Growth 1
Peg 0.0024 1
Peg Spell -0.0475 0.6243* 1
Capital Controls -0.1032* 0.086 0.0049 1
Crisis -0.0213 -0.1465* -0.1769* 0.046 1
Asia
Growth Peg Peg Spell
Capital 
Controls    Crisis
Growth 1
Peg -0.0139 1
Peg Spell -0.0071 0.8204* 1
Capital Controls -0.1278* 0.2207* 0.2118* 1
Crisis -0.0761 0.033 0.0563 -0.0366 1
Europe
Growth Peg Peg Spell
Capital 
Controls    Crisis
Growth 1
Peg -0.1034 1
Peg Spell -0.1281 0.7819* 1
Capital Controls ....
Crisis -0.08 0.0619 0.1224 . 1
.Table 4:
Correlations Between Growth, Peg, Peg Spell, Capital Controls and Crisis (Controling for Country Fixed-Effects)
Growth Peg Peg Spell
Capital 
Controls    Crisis
Growth 1
Peg 0.0058 1
Peg Spell -0.0216 0.4262* 1
Capital Controls -0.0733* 0.0698* -0.0163 1
Crisis -0.0033 -0.0152 0.0129 0.0145 1
Africa
Growth Peg Peg Spell
Capital 
Controls    Crisis
Growth 1
Peg 0.019 1
Peg Spell 0.0125 0.5031* 1
Capital Controls -0.0161 0.1474* 0.1832* 1
Crisis -0.0009 0.0419 0.0800* -0.048 1
Latin
Growth Peg Peg Spell
Capital 
Controls    Crisis
Growth 1
Peg -0.0145 1
Peg Spell -0.0755 0.3788* 1
Capital Controls -0.1619* 0.0699 -0.0960* 1
Crisis 0.0168 -0.0559 -0.0673 0.0423 1
Asia
Growth Peg Peg Spell
Capital 
Controls    Crisis
Growth 1
Peg 0.0391 1
Peg Spell -0.0459 0.4468* 1
Capital Controls 0.0358 -0.1195* -0.0772 1
Crisis -0.0692 -0.0499 0.0277 0.0118 1
Europe
Growth Peg Peg Spell
Capital 
Controls    Crisis
Growth 1
Peg -0.1345 1
Peg Spell 0.0207 0.0513 1
Capital Controls 0001
Crisis 0.0729 -0.0096 0.0192 0 1
.Table 5:  The Effect of Exchange Rate and Capital Account Regimes
on Growth: Controling For The Crisis Probability
Panel A: Dependent Variable: Growth Rates
Variables (i) (ii)
Peg (instrumented) 2.8765 5.2629
(2.2557) (2.5410)**
Capital Controls (t-1) -1.1760 -1.5811
(0.8093)* (0.8323)*
Switch to Capital Controls between t-2 to t-1 -1.0252 -2.8357
(1.1191) (1.4304)**
Growth t-1 0.2006 0.1986
(0.0315)*** (0.0314)***
Growth t-2 -0.0713 -0.0737
(0.0303)** (0.0303)**
The Crisis Probability -- -6.0377
(2.9790)**
Adj R-Square 0.062 0.066
DW 1.99 1.99
Panel B: Dependent Variable: Currency Crisis (0,1). 1 if REE(t)-REE(t-1)>15%
Coefficient dF/dX
(Probit)
Peg (instrumented) 2.6578 0.6008
(0.8524)*** (0.1920)***
Capital Controls (t-1) -0.4594 -0.1217
(0.2686)* (0.0808)*
Switch to Capital Controls Between t-2 to t-1 -1.2737 -0.2879
(0.4518)*** (0.0988)***
External Debt ($ Billions) 0.0125 0.0028
(0.0049)** (0.0011)**
Pseudo R-Square 0.2031 0.2031
DW 1.99 1.99
Panel C: Dependent Variable: Peg (0,1).





All specifications include country-fixed effects.
The specification in panel A includes also budget deficit (insignificant).
The specification in panel C includes also time fixed effects.   
 Standard errors in parenthesis
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%Table 6:   
Non Linear Effects of Currency Regimes on Growth
Dependent variable: Growth Rates
Panel A: linear Panel B^: quadratic Panel C^: ^2 and ^3
Variables (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
Peg (instrumented)  2.8765 5.2629 8.6448 8.4918 9.6462 7.0377
(2.2557) (2.5410)** (4.0144)** (4.0091)** (7.1621) (7.2795)
Peg^2 -- -- -16.2712 -9.2390 -22.6610 0.2035
(9.5537)* (10.2252) (39.0248) (40.7507)
Peg^3 -- -- -- -- 7.3612 -10.6584
(43.5874) (44.5246)
Capital Controls (t-1) -1.1760 -1.5811 -1.3239 -1.7576 -1.3192 -1.7762
(0.8093)* (0.8323)* (0.7821) (0.8132)* (0.7830)* (0.8174)**
Switch to Capital Controls between t-2 to t-1 -1.0252 -2.8357 -0.9813 -2.7122 -0.9869 -2.7510
(1.1191) (1.4304)** (1.0773) (1.4066)* (1.0784) (1.4166)*
Growth t-1 0.2006 0.1986 0.1837 0.1824 0.1836 0.1826
(0.0315)*** (0.0314)*** (0.0305)*** (0.0304)*** (0.0305)*** (0.0304)***
Growth t-2 -0.0713 -0.0737 -0.0725 -0.0743 -0.0725 -0.0743
(0.0303)** (0.0303)** (0.0293)** (0.0293)** (0.0294)** (0.0293)**
The Crisis Probability -- -6.0377 -- -5.8760 -- -6.0352
(2.9790)** (3.0768)* (3.1496)*
Adj R-Square 0.062 0.066 0.097  0.097 0.097  0.097
DW 1.99 1.99 1.99 1.99 1.99 1.99
Note:
All specifications include country-fixed effects.
The specification in panel A includes also budget deficit (insignificant).
The specification in panel C includes also time fixed effects.   
 Standard errors in parenthesis
^ Only in the growth equation.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%Table 7:  The Effect of Exchange Rate and Capital Account Regimes on Growth: 
Probit, Logit, and Linear Probability Models 
Panel A: Dependent Variable: Growth Rates
Variables (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Peg (instrumented)^ 2.8765 5.2629 5.0509 4.8414
(2.2557) (2.5410)** (2.4859)** (2.6585)*
Capital Controls (t-1) -1.1760 -1.5811 -1.5271 -1.5313
(0.8093)* (0.8323)* (0.8255)* (0.8481)*
Switch to Capital Controls between t-2 to t-1 -1.0252 -2.8357 -2.7956 -2.7802
(1.1191) (1.4304)** (1.4084)** (1.6837)*
Growth t-1 0.2006 0.1986 0.1984 0.2000
(0.0315)*** (0.0314)*** (0.0314)*** (0.0315)***
Growth t-2 -0.0713 -0.0737 -0.0740 -0.0726
(0.0303)** (0.0303)** (0.0303)** (0.0303)**
The Crisis Probability -- -6.0377 -5.5940 -5.0882
(2.9790)** (2.7106)** (3.6483)*
Adj R-Square 0.062 0.066 0.066 0.064
DW 1.99 1.99 1.99 1.99
Panel B: Dependent Variable: Currency Crisis (0,1). 1 if REE(t)-REE(t-1)>15%
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Probit Logit Linear
Peg (instrumented)^ 2.6578 4.5922 0.7708
(0.8524)*** (1.5553)*** (0.2386)***
Capital Controls (t-1) -0.4594 -0.8375 -0.1112
(0.2686)* (0.4900)* (0.0512)**
Switch to Capital Controls Between t-2 to t-1 -1.2737 -2.3839 -0.3172
(0.4518)*** (0.7605)*** (0.0815)***
External Debt ($ Billions) 0.0125 0.0236 0.0028
(0.0049)** (0.0086)*** (0.0011)**
Pseudo R-Square 0.2031 0.2055
Adj R-Square 0.2407
DW 1.99 1.99 1.99
Note:
All specifications include country-fixed effects.
The specification in panel A includes also budget deficit (insignificant).
The specification in panel C includes also time fixed effects.   
^ Instrumented as in panel C of Table 5
( ) Standard errors in parenthesis
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%Table 8:
The Effect of Exchange Rate and Capital Controls Regimes: 
The Reinhart-Rogoff (2002) Classification*,**
Dependent Variable: Growth Rates
Variables (i) (ii) (iii)
Peg at time t-1 1.656 1.330 1.729
(0.557) (0.549) (0.565)
Capital Controls at t-1 -0.439 -0.587 0.156
(0.890) (0.991) (1.022)
Switching to Capital Controls between t-2 to t-1 -5.852 -3.374 -6.155
(1.799) (1.518) (1.809)
The probability of having currency crisis this year^ -14.843 -22.359
excluding the effect of price crisis (4.937) (7.996)
The probability of having currency crisis this year - real^^ -6.824 7.632
including the effect of price crisis  (4.084) (6.578)
Controllers
Growth rate at time t-1 0.176 0.191 0.183
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
Growth rate at time t-2 0.008 0.022 0.019
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
Currency crisis at time t-1 2.812 0.917 3.340
(0.978) (0.629) (1.069)
Currency crisis at time t-2 -1.904 -1.804 -1.831
(0.479) (0.483) (0.481)
Price (CPI) crisis at time t-1 -0.100 1.078 -1.251
(0.491) (0.772) (1.133)
Price (CPI) crisis at time t-2 0.385 0.374 0.468
(0.488) (0.491) (0.490)
Notes:
* Reinhart and Rogoff (2002) classified into 5 categories: (i) peg, (ii) limited flexibility, (iii) managed floating
, (iv) freely floating and (v) freely falling. We aggregate it into 2 main categories: (i) peg_rr, including the first 3 and (ii) 
float_rr, including the other two.
** Data includes 58 countries in the years 1970 to 1997
^ The estimated the likelihood for a currency crisis ignoring the effect of price crisis.
^^ The estimated probability for a currency crisis including the effect of past price crisis
All specifications include linear time trend
( ) Standard errors in parenthesisTable 9:
The Effect of Sudden Stop Crisis and 
Dollarization (Foreign Liabilities - Money Supply Ratio) on Growth
Variable (i) (ii) (iii)
Foreign Liabilities - Money Suuply Ratio 0.001 -0.001 0.000
(FLM) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042)
Sudden Stop Crisis -0.881 -0.781 -0.250
(0.384) (0.378) (0.431)
Growth at t-1 0.173 0.172
(0.021) (0.021)
Interaction
Sudden Stop Crisis * FLM -2.384
(0.931)
Country fixed effect Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2228 2228 2228Table 10:
The Effect of Sudden Stop Crisis on Dollarization (Foreign Liabilities - Money Supply Ratio)
Variable (i) (ii) (iii)
Crisis at t-2 -0.034 -0.034
(0.020) (0.020)
Peg at time t-2 0.042 0.010
(0.024) (0.028)
Capital Controls at t-2 -0.013 -0.009
(0.028) (0.028)
The probability of having currency crisis this year^ -0.200 -0.176
(0.070) (0.083)
Country fixed effect Yes Yes Yes





































































Frequncies of probability (probit)
Linear probability - level
"Linear probability - switch"
Probit - level
Probit - switch